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I. INTRODUCTION
Luz Elena Corona felt the gnawing pains in her stomach intensify.1
                                                                
*  Editor’s Note: This article was published in 6 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 615 (1998) without the
first six footnotes.  This article is now being published in its corrected form.  Please cite to this
volume when referring to this article.
**  J.D. Candidate, 1999, American University Washington College of Law.
1. See Molly Moore, Rights of Pregnant Workers At Issue On Mexican Border, WASH. POST, Aug.
21, 1996, at A20 (recounting the experience of an employee who worked in Mexico for a
United States based company).
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She asked her supervisor for permission to go home early, but he
refused her request.2  A few minutes later, shortly after 1:00 a.m., Luz
Elena Corona ran to the bathroom where she had a miscarriage.3
She returned to work, leaving her dead fetus in the factory
bathroom.4  Although Luz Elena Corona was bleeding, her supervisor
refused to allow her to leave work in order to go to a doctor.5
Instead, he forced her to continue packing plastic skirt hangers.6
Unfortunately, Luz Elena Corona’s story is not unusual; her
supervisor punished her because she was pregnant.7
A 1996 investigation in Mexico by Human Rights Watch, a
Washington, D.C.-based non-profit human rights organization, found
that pregnant workers in maquiladoras,8 or export processing factories,
are discriminated against in order to maintain low production costs.9
Such gender discrimination occurs during the hiring process and
during employment.10  The 1996 Human Rights Watch study found
that United States U.S.-based Multi-National Enterprises (“MNEs”)
including: General Motors, Zenith, Teledyne, Carlisle Plastics,
American Telephone & Telegraph, International Telephone &
Telegraph Corp., TRW, W.R. Grace, General Electric, and Sunbeam-
Oster,11 often partly or wholly own or subcontract these factories or
maquilas.
                                                                
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.  During her interview, Luz Elena Corona remarked that she “felt like a cow in a
market.”  In 1993, after eleven years of employment with Carlisle Plastics, Inc., she claims she
was fired for distributing workers’ rights literature at the plant.  See id.
6. See Moore, supra note 1, at A20 (addressing the exploitation of Mexican women in the
labor industry).
7. See generally No Guarantees: Sex Discrimination in Mexico’s Maquiladora Sector, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH WOMEN’S RIGHTS PROJECT (Human Rights Watch Women’s Rights Project
Report), Aug. 1996, at 2-10 [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH].
8. See DENNIS R. APPLEYARD & ALFRED J. FIELD, JR., INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 341
(1995) (explaining that the maquiladoras are industrial parks located in Northern Mexico).  The
first maquiladoras were established during the mid-1960s to encourage foreign direct investment
in Mexico by U.S. companies.  Id.  In addition to cheap labor, the Mexican government offered
these companies other economic incentives, such as tariff reductions, to encourage them to
locate their production facilities in Mexico.  Id.
9. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 7 (stating that pregnancy discrimination
persists because the government’s interest in attracting and retaining foreign investment
dovetails with the economic interests of maquiladora operators to keep their operating costs as
low as possible).
10. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 2 (noting that, as a condition of
employment, women must undergo a pregnancy test and may not be hired if they are
pregnant).
11. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 3 (implicating U.S.-based companies in the
reported findings).
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Part I of this Comment uses the 1996 Human Rights Watch
investigation12 to argue that the North American Agreement on
Labor Cooperation (“NAALC”)13 dispute resolution system should be
assessed for its effectiveness, or lack thereof, in protecting workers’
rights.  To date, the NAALC’s dispute resolution system has not been
extensively tested. The Human Rights Watch investigation is
particularly timely because it reflects the emerging conflict between
protecting workers’ rights in Mexico and Mexico’s policy of
encouraging increased trade and foreign direct investment (“FDI”).14
Part II briefly outlines the history of the North American Free
Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”),15 its role in Mexico’s economic growth,
and the controversy it created in the U.S. concerning whether
NAFTA sufficiently protects workers’ rights.16  This Part outlines the
NAALC, a side agreement that was written to provide external
mechanisms to compel NAFTA members to enforce their own
domestic labor laws.17
Part III analyzes Mexico’s labor laws.  This section focuses on the
underlying economic reasons that Mexico has not enforced its laws
while simultaneously using the Human Rights Watch investigation to
support the allegation of non-enforcement.  Part III concludes that
national economic development justifications proffered by free trade
economists should not take precedent over the economic and moral
reasons for enforcement of labor laws.
                                                                
12. This Comment uses the terms “sex discrimination” and “pregnancy discrimination”
interchangeably.  See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 2 (classifying that pregnancy
discrimination is sex discrimination because pregnancy is unique to females).  This Comment
does not address whether protections for pregnant workers constitute special treatment or
equal treatment.  See also SALLY J. KENNEY, FOR WHOSE PROTECTION?  REPRODUCTIVE HAZARDS
AND EXCLUSIONARY POLICIES IN THE UNITED STATES AND BRITAIN 73-75 (1992) (outlining the
strengths and weaknesses of special treatment and equal treatment theories in ending sex
discrimination).
13. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, Can.–Mex.–U.S., 32 I.L.M.
1499 [hereinafter NAALC].  The NAALC entered into force on January 1, 1994.  See U.S.C. §
3311(b) (1994) (enabling member countries to monitor each others’ enforcement of labor
laws).
14. See generally infra Part III.C.1 (discussing the economic reasons for Mexico’s lax
enforcement of its labor laws).
15. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., H.R. DOC. NO.
103-159 (effective Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAFTA].  See also NAFTA NOW! THE CHANGING
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NORTH AMERICA viii (Brenda M. McPhail ed., 1995) [hereinafter
NAFTA NOW!] (discussing the economic and social changes that NAFTA will bring to North
America).
16. Sidney Weintraub, NAFTA: For Better or Worse, in NAFTA NOW!, supra note 15, at 7.
17. See Michael J. McGuinness, The Protection of Labor Rights in North America: A Commentary
on the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, 30 STAN. J. INT’L L. 579, 582-83 (1994)
(noting that the Trilateral Alliance composed of NAFTA members drafted the NAALC and
appended it to NAFTA on August 13, 1993).  It became effective on January 1, 1994.  Id.
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Part IV describes how Mexico lacks effective labor law enforcement
to prevent pregnancy discrimination.  Consequently, this Comment
explores whether external remedies under the NAALC may be used
to prevent gender discrimination in Mexico.  In particular, it focuses
on a recent submission18 filed by Human Rights Watch with the U.S.
National Administrative Office (“NAO”)19 urging a U.S. government
investigation into pregnancy discrimination in Mexico.20  This section
describes the NAALC investigative process and speculates how a
submission regarding alleged pregnancy discrimination might
progress through the NAALC’s dispute system.  Part IV also briefly
discusses the NAO’s response and rendered decision to the Human
Rights Watch’s allegation.  It recommends that human rights
organizations continue to file submissions regarding allegations of
workers’ rights violations with the NAO to test the NAALC dispute
resolution system.
Finally, Part V recommends that any country that wants to join
NAFTA be required to sign the NAALC and abide by its obligation to
enforce domestic labor laws.  It also discusses how future trade
negotiations in the U.S. may become more complicated and
controversial than NAFTA if the NAALC fails.
II. CONTROVERSY OVER NAFTA AND THE DRAFTING OF THE NAALC
A. The Goals and Aspirations of NAFTA
NAFTA’s main goal is to promote economic development for its
members by eliminating impediments to free trade in goods, capital,
and services among signatory countries.21  Modern economists and
politicians believe that increased international trade is essential to
facilitate economic development and prosperity.22
                                                                
18. SUBMISSION CONCERNING PREGNANCY-BASED SEX DISCRIMINATION IN MEXICO’S
MAQUILADORA SECTOR TO THE U.S. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE 4 (Human Rights Watch Women’s
Rights Project ed., 1997) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS SUBMISSION] (documenting Mexico’s
failure to enforce anti-discrimination laws or address labor rights violations).
19. See NAALC, supra note 13, sec. C (establishing three NAOs, one each for Mexico,
Canada, and the United States, and discussing the functions of the NAO).
20. See McGuinness, supra note 17, at 582-86 (summarizing the dispute resolution process
under the NAALC and the various governmental organizations that carry out the process).
21. See Weintraub, supra note 16, at 6 (stating that from the U.S. viewpoint, such
impediments include high tariffs, administratively burdensome investment requirements, and
other protectionist measures).
22. Globally, the value of trade in goods exceeded $3.7 trillion in 1992, and the value in
services equaled approximately $1 trillion.  See generally APPLEYARD & FIELD, supra note 8, at 12-
14 (noting the increased importance of international trade and the need for adjustment by
countries).
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